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Abstract—The adoption of large-scale iris recognition systems
around the world has brought to light the importance of
detecting presentation attack images (textured contact lenses
and printouts). This work presents a new approach in iris
Presentation Attack Detection (PAD), by exploring combinations
of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and transformed input
spaces through binarized statistical image features (BSIF). Our
method combines lightweight CNNs to classify multiple BSIF
views of the input image. Following explorations on complemen-
tary input spaces leading to more discriminative features to detect
presentation attacks, we also propose an algorithm to select the
best (and most discriminative) predictors for the task at hand.
An ensemble of predictors makes use of their expected individual
performances to aggregate their results into a final prediction.
Results show that this technique improves on the current state
of the art in iris PAD, outperforming the winner of LivDet-Iris
2017 competition both for intra- and cross-dataset scenarios, and
illustrating the very difficult nature of the cross-dataset scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
HOW can we distinguish between two individuals withoutreasonable doubt? This question has motivated bio-
metric researchers for centuries — from the pioneer works
of Bertillon and Galton to recent advances in biometric-
enabled mobile payments and wearable devices. Numerous
biometric characteristics emerged, and sometimes faded away,
as the field progressed, but one biometric trait that has surely
withstood the test of time is iris recognition. The iris pattern
is unique and “determined epigenetically by random events
in the morphogenesis of this tissue” [1], and thus offers high
discrimination power, making it useful in distinguishing even
identical twins [2].
The recognition power and matching speed of iris recog-
nition has propelled it into use in large-scale applications,
e.g., Unique ID in India [3], [4], and the NEXUS system
operated jointly by the Canada Border Services Agency and
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to speed up the
identification of pre-screened travelers [5]. As iris recognition
becomes more pervasive, the number and variety of attempted
attacks naturally intensify, and the problem of presentation
attack detection (PAD) becomes an essential research topic.
According to the standardized vocabulary in ISO/IEC
30107-1, a presentation attack is a “presentation to the biomet-
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Fig. 1: Overview of the proposed method. The first step is
generating multiple views from dataset by training lightweight
CNNs fed with different BSIF representations, referred to as
multi-view-CNN predictors. Next, we select the most promis-
ing predictors according to their relevance and complementar-
ity, and combine them via meta-fusion approach.
ric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the
operation of the biometric system” [6]. An impostor may seek
to obtain unauthorized access to an authentication system by
impersonating a legitimate user, or may want to intentionally
conceal his or her identity to avoid recognition. Presentation
attacks can be realized in various ways, in particular by
presenting artifacts, such as paper printouts or textured contact
lenses, non-conformant use of a biometric sensor, or even
presenting cadaver eyes to the sensor. In this paper, we focus
on attacks related to presentation of artificial objects.
The Iris Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet-Iris, www.
livdet.org) was begun in 2013. The third and the most recent
edition took place in 2017 [7]. This competition is focused on
properly measuring how well current technology withstands
presentation attacks employing artifacts. The sequence of
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competitions provides an important insight into the pace of
evolution of iris PAD methods. The results reported in the 2017
competition show that iris PAD algorithms are still far from
achieving acceptable detection rates. Moreover, the LivDet
2017 results suggest that challenging evaluation protocols,
such as cross-dataset and cross-sensor setups — hereinafter
referred to as cross-domain — can be considered the major
limitation of current PAD algorithms and a current open
research problem.
In the face of the evident need for better iris PAD, this
paper introduces a new technique based on exploiting multiple
transformations of the input data so as to enhance comple-
mentary patterns, leading to a more discriminant manifold
separating genuine authentication attempts from attacks. The
multiple transformations are obtained through the combination
of hand-crafted and data-driven approaches. While Binarized
Statistical Image Features (BSIF) [8] is a popular, effective and
partially hand-crafted texture descriptor, Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) complement the repertoire with powerful
description methods capable of learning even the subtlest dis-
crimination clue present in the available training data through
a series of non-linear transformations on the input data.
Although BSIF- and CNN-based methods have been used
before in iris PAD, to our knowledge there are no published
papers dealing with the challenges of cross-domain deploy-
ments, or exploiting complementary properties of various
feature extractors and classification strategies when defining
a discriminative manifold for the problem under cross-domain
constraints. In this vein, we introduce a way of combining
both methodologies, hand-crafted and data-driven, in order to
offer an iris PAD algorithm that better generalizes to unknown
attack types. In addition, we also present a novel meta-analysis
algorithm for selecting and aggregating the most prominent
data views (i.e., transformations), based on two well-known
techniques for feature selection: the random forest importance
feature weighting and the inter-rater agreement measures, so
as to provide the most accurate detection method with the least
possible computational impact. Fig 1 gives an overview of the
proposed method.
In summary, the main contributions and novelties of this
work are:
• A new approach that leverages multiple pre-trained BSIF
filters to effectively train lightweight CNNs;
• A new fusion algorithm that selects and combines multi-
ple classifiers, considering their importance and comple-
mentarity;
• A thorough cross-domain evaluation of the problem on
datasets currently used to document the state of the art
in the field;
• A new PAD method that outperforms the winner of
the most recent LivDet-Iris competition, the authoritative
international challenge on the subject.
To encourage reproducibility, the source code of our imple-
mentation will be publicly available on GitHub. The datasets
are already available through the LivDet competition. In the
remainder of this paper, we briefly survey important iris PAD
methods in prior art (Sec. II) and introduce the proposed
methodology (Sec. III). Then we present experiments and
validation (Sec. IV) and, finally, draw conclusions and present
possible future work (Sec. V).
II. RELATED WORK
The first ideas for countermeasures against iris presentation
attacks were proposed some 18 years ago by Daugman [9] and
became a basis of many current effective PAD methods. Early
Daugman’s concepts include finding anomalies in Fourier
spectrum to detect printed irises, either on a paper or on
a contact lens, detection of specular “Purkinje” reflections
from both the cornea and the lens, or investigating pupil
size variations, either spontaneous (“hippus”) or stimulated by
visible light.
In general, there are two goals in presentation attacks,
impersonation or identity concealment. The first successful
demonstration of impersonation with the use of a commercial
sensor was shown by Thalheim et al. [10]. They used iris
images printed on a paper, with a hole cut where the pupil
was printed, to make a successful impersonation attack on a
commercial iris recognition system with authentic eyes previ-
ously enrolled. The first use of one’s eye to evade recognition
observed in an operational environment was recorded at the
border crossing point employing iris recognition in the United
Arab Emirates [11]. The attackers administered eye drops to
make the pupil excessively dilated. This made the iris texture
deformed too severely to be compensated by feature extraction
and matching algorithms, and hence generating false non-
matches. Since these early demonstrations of vulnerabilities,
other presentation attack instruments have been studied, in-
cluding use of textured contact lenses that partially occlude the
actual iris texture [12], presentation of iris images displayed
on a screen [13], or use of prosthetic eyes [14]. After recent
studies by Trokielewicz et al. [15] presenting that post-mortem
iris recognition is possible for a couple of weeks after death,
cadaver eyes can also be considered as a potential presentation
attack instrument.
There is a rich literature on PAD methods presenting various
levels of sophistication, and putting different requirements
on the sensors’ configuration and signals necessary to detect
presentation attacks. In the largest group of PAD methods, a
single near-infrared iris image, compliant to ISO/IEC 19794-
6, is used in both identity verification and presentation attack
detection. The hand-crafted approaches use various image
descriptors to calculate image features, which are used to
distinguish between authentic irises and artifacts typically
through the use of Support Vector Machine classifiers. Popular
techniques used in calculation of PAD-related iris image
features are Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF) [16],
Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [12], Binary Gabor Patterns
(BGP) [17], Local Contrast-Phase Descriptor (LCPD) [18],
Local Phase Quantization (LPQ) [19], Scale Invariant Descrip-
tor (SID) [20], Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) and
DAISY [21], Locally Uniform Comparison Image Descriptor
(LUCID) and CENsus TRansform hISTogram (CENTRIST)
[22], Weber Local Descriptor (WLD) [18], Wavelet Packet
Transform (WPT) [23] or image quality descriptors proposed
by Galbally et al. [24]. Instead of “hand-crafting” effective
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(a) Raw iris image (b) B3×3×5 (c) B7×7×12
Fig. 2: Examples of different BSIF representations Bn×n×l (2b,2c) of the same image (2a). Note how the structure of the
contact lens is highlighted through the different representations.
feature extractors, one may also benefit from recently popular
data-driven approaches that learn directly from the data how
to process and classify iris images to solve the PAD task [21],
[25]–[29].
The above PAD methods rely upon an iris image that is
typically used later for biometric recognition, and hence they
can be implemented in the existing iris recognition sensors.
However, if some hardware adaptations are possible, and
some more complicated static features of the eye can be
measured, one may consider multi-spectral analysis [23], [30]–
[32] or estimation of three-dimensional iris features [33]–[36]
as potential PAD techniques. Making the PAD more complex,
one may consider measuring spontaneous dynamic features of
the eye, such as micro-movements of an eyeball, either using
Eulerian video magnification [37] or by using an eye-tracking
device [38]. If there is a possibility to additionally stimulate
the eye with varying visible light, and measure its reaction,
the use of pupil dynamic models may help to easily detect
static or oddly-behaving artifacts [32], [39]. A recent survey
by Czajka and Bowyer provides a comprehensive assessment
of the state of the art in iris PAD [40].
In [41], a PAD approach based on deep features extracted
from different iris regions and classified by feature and score-
level fusion of SVM is described. The authors report very
low error rates on a subset of the LivDet-Iris 2017 datasets.
Kontschieder et al. [42] published a work that seeks to com-
bine deep convolutional networks for feature extraction, with
the classification power of Random Forests. They describe
an alternative approach to train Random Forest classifiers,
which consists of a stochastic version of decision trees that
are trainable through backpropagation. Random Forests trained
with this method can either be standalone classifiers or act as
alternative classifiers on top of a CNN. The authors claim to
have outperformed the state of the art in image classification
when integrating it to a GoogLeNet network.
Evaluation of PAD reliability significantly differs from
statistical evaluation of biometric recognition. ISO/IEC JTC1
subcommittee 37 issued both the PAD-related vocabulary [6],
and recommendations on how to evaluate and report the
PAD-related performance [43]. An important effort related
to iris PAD evaluation is the LivDet-Iris competition series
(http://livdet.org/), which has had editions in 2013 [44], 2015
[45] and 2017 [7]. The 2017 edition of LivDet-Iris is the most
recent, global, independent evaluation of PAD algorithms for
detection of iris printouts and textured contact lenses. This
paper follows exactly the LivDet-Iris 2017 evaluation protocol,
and the results presented herein are directly comparable with
the LivDet-Iris 2017 winning solution.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
The task of the PAD algorithm is to capture differences
between an actual live iris and either non-iris object, non-
conformant use of an actual iris, or a cadaver eye. In the
simplest scenario, when only static features of a single iris
image are used, the PAD method recognizes anomalies in
the presented iris texture. However, given different fabrication
processes and the richness of details in an iris, it is likely that
any single texture descriptor cannot capture all necessary leads
hinting at a possible attack. Therefore fusions of different tex-
ture descriptors (e.g., LBP, BSIF, Gabor filters) and classifiers
(e.g., Support Vector Machines, Neural Networks, etc.) have
also been explored in prior literature.
Although texture analysis has been a staple in iris research
over the years, development of image processing methods that
capture such intricate textures has been a challenge. Therefore,
more recently some researchers have brought to bear data-
driven techniques, especially deep CNNs, to learn directly
from training data the iris features useful in PAD. Normally,
the input of such networks are the raw pixels themselves. Even
though such data-driven methods have led to good results,
these models do not work well in the so-called cross-domain
setup, i.e., when different training/testing conditions are part
of the problem. As such, the conditions during training are not
enough to allow robust generalization during testing.
This is where our work herein comes into play. In this
section, we present a way of accelerating and empowering
CNNs to capture texture patterns in such a way that differences
among genuine and attack samples can be more easily spotted.
Conscious of the representational power of CNNs to properly
learn discriminative features, but at the same time of their
innate need of large amounts of training data, we facilitate the
process of learning by feeding the network with transformed
input that highlights texture features important to make a
distinction between a live iris and a presentation attack iris. We
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achieve this by transforming the input image into Binarized
Statistical Image Features (BSIFs) [46]. Second, it is likely
that looking at the iris texture patterns from different vantage
points, including different scales, might allow us extracting
more features capturing differences between authentic iris
patterns and artifacts.
Thus, we consider using multiple BSIF filter sets, charac-
terized by a scale l and a depth n (number of filter kernels in
a single set) to create BSIF representations Bn×n×l for each
(i, j) pixel of the original image I:
Bn×n×l(i, j) =
n−1∑
k=0
bk(i, j)2
k
where
bk(i, j) =
{
1 if sk(i, j) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
,
sk(i, j) =
l−1∑
u=0
l−1∑
v=0
wk;n,l(u, v)I(i+ u, j + v),
and wk;n,l is the k-th filter kernel in the set of filters derived for
a given n and l. Using original sets of BSIF filters, as proposed
by Kannala and Rahtu [46], allows calculating 60 different
BSIF representations of a single image. Each of these 60 image
transformations is then used by one CNN to learn higher-level
features for discriminating authentic and presentation attack
irises. Finally, with different learned features at hand, a natural
question is how to effectively select the best ones for PAD
detection while eliminating the non-representative ones. For
this we exploit two different fusion schemes: one based on
random-forest feature weighting and meta-learning strategies,
and the second relying upon inter-rater agreement measures.
BSIF kernels included into each of 60 sets were calcu-
lated from natural images in a way that maximizes statistical
independence of filter responses, and the Independent Com-
ponent Analysis was used for this purpose [46]. Assuming
that patterns observed in artifacts are statistically independent
of textures observed in authentic irises, such decomposition
of images, and then building BSIF representations of image
based on binarized filter responses, may facilitate calculating
PAD-related features from BSIF representations instead of raw
images.
While it is theoretically possible to train a CNN to obtain
the same filters as BSIF in its first convolutional layer, the
cost function and the training process would be significantly
different from our goals and would likely require more training
data than one normally has for solving a PAD problem. To
reduce the amount of training data, we thus transform the
images to a new space represented through BSIF operations
and this new input serves as an additional transformation
layer for the CNNs. As we go toward the output layers in
the CNN, such features are further specialized to higher-
level representations. The idea is that feeding the network
with a transformed input would allow it to more quickly
achieve such deeper representations without extensive training.
However, some useful features may still not be learned from
this transformed space. Therefore, drawing on good results
from previous studies in the PAD literature [26], [47], in
addition to learning features from these transformed spaces,
we also consider learning features directly from raw image
inputs. At the end, with fusion strategies, we can show how
such different treatments are complementary and how some
of them do not contribute to separate authentic samples from
artifacts. The key aspect of our methodology is that different
filters learned from transformed spaces capture richer details
than just a single representation and translate to better results
in the difficult cross-dataset setup, the one in which training
and testing conditions are different.
Finally, we end up with 61 CNN-based predictors: 60 fed by
BSIF representations and 1 fed by the raw image. We refer to
such complementary CNNs learned with different input repre-
sentations as multi-view-CNN predictors. Finding the optimal
decomposition of the numerous possible configurations of the
BSIF filter sets is not straightforward. That is exactly why the
combination of CNNs is powerful.
Since one of the CNN-based predictor operates on a raw
image, it is interesting to compare its first-layer filters with
those used in BSIF transformation. Visual comparison of these
filters reveals some similarities: at a small scale (3× 3), most
of them resemble edge, corner or dot detectors, similarly to
what we would expect in the V1/V2 regions of the brain
specialized in roughly describing visual inputs through edges
and corners. However, BSIF 3 × 3 filters and CNN 3 × 3
filters are different. This means that the CNN operating on
raw images developed its own way to preprocess the images
in the first layer when compared to BSIF-based transformation,
which may suggest that this predictor is complementary to the
remaining 60 predictors, and it is worth using in the fusion.
Fig. 1 illustrates the main steps in our approach, which are
explained in details in the following sections.
A. Feature Extraction
We compute BSIF representations by exploiting filter width
size ranges from 3 × 3 to 17 × 17, and depth (i.e., number
of filters in a set) ranges from 5 to 12. Fig. 2 shows some
examples of BSIF views of the same image presenting an
iris with a textured contact lens. Note how different BSIF
representations highlight the pattern of a contact-lens.
We use OSIRIS [48] (version 4.1) 1 to find the center of
the iris in the original (not BSIF-transformed) image. Next,
we crop a 260× 260 region around the iris in both the BSIF-
transformed images and the original image. These cropped
samples are input to the CNNs in the next step. This 260×260
size is based on the size of iris images in commercial sensors
(640× 480) and the ISO/IEC 19794-6 recommendation for a
minimum 120 pixels across the iris diameter.
To substantiate the descriptive advantage offered by BSIF
filtering over the raw image input, we performed a baseline
classification using a linear SVM to compare classification
accuracies. While the best accuracy obtained with raw images
1Source code is available in http://svnext.it-sudparis.eu/svnview2-eph/
ref syst/Iris Osiris v4.1/
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Fig. 3: Performance comparison of the proposed CNN operating on BSIF inputs of varying scale and depth. Accuracies are
estimated over the test unknown partition of each dataset.
was below 80%, some of the BSIF filters achieved perfor-
mance superior to 95%. Besides, the mean accuracy of BSIF
images was higher, confirming the potential benefit of some
of the filters.
With the intention of better understanding the results of
BSIF images as input features, we performed an ablation
analysis on the effect of scale and depth of the BSIF filters on
the final classification. A CNN classifier (described in Section
III-B) was trained on different input images, generated by
BSIF filtering, first varying filter sizes, and then their depths.
Results of this analysis are shown in Figure 3. It is possible
to observe that some particular scales or depths have some
(positive or negative) impact on the classification accuracy,
but it is not possible to infer a generalizable trend.
In the same vein, we also tried to vary the size of the filter
in the first convolutional layer of the CNN, while training it to
perform classification on original images, and compared these
results with BSIF (Fig. 4). In this case, the BSIF classification
accuracy was consistently higher, presenting also a smaller
variability in the results than the Raw input image. These
results suggest a better capability of BSIF filters to capture
discriminating features of attack images. Along with the BSIF
scale/depth analysis, results indicate there is a potential gain
when using some BSIF filters, and this encouraged us to
develop our fusion strategy explained ahead.
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Fig. 4: Performance comparison between BSIF and raw image
as the input to the CNN. Accuracies are estimated over the test
unknown partition of each dataset. The length of the whiskers
equals to one standard deviation of the obtained results.
B. Classification using lightweight CNNs
As already mentioned, we train a CNN model for each of
60 BSIF transformations of the original image and a CNN for
the original image, for a total of 61 CNNs. As we will show
in our experiments, the ensemble of the most complementary
CNN models allows us to exploit different aspects of the iris
image texture, which is important to achieve high detection
rates, especially in challenging scenarios, such as cross-sensor
and cross-dataset evaluation protocols.
Given that we do not have large training datasets, and also to
avoid possible overfitting to specific datasets through the use of
millions of parameters, we opt to use a not-too-deep network
architecture. Experiments with deeper configurations did not
translate into improved results in our case (Fig. 5). Inspired
by Menotti et al. [26], our CNN architecture comprises two
convolutional layers, and two fully-connected layers. Batch
normalization [49] is applied after each convolutional layer,
to optimize the training procedure. The input of the network
is an image of configurable size. The first convolutional layer
consists of 16 filters of size 3 × 3 and Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) activation. Next, MaxPooling on a 9×9 pixel window
and stride 2 is applied, just before the first batch normalization.
The second convolutional layer comprises 32 filters of size
3 × 3 and ReLU activation. MaxPooling on a 9 × 9 area
with stride 8 and batch normalization follow this layer. The
output of convolutional layers is fed into a fully-connected
layer composed of 1,024 ReLU activated neurons. Finally, the
output layer is formed by two units, corresponding to two
classes we want to recognize (authentic iris vs. presentation
attack iris) following the SoftMax transformation.
C. Ensemble Fusion of Multiple Views
In this section, we present the proposed approaches for
fusing the result of the ensemble of CNNs.
1) Random Forest Fusion: Random Forests is a well-known
ensemble method that has been used for classifier fusion [50]
as well as for variable importance ranking [51], [52]. It is
composed of multiple decision trees built on different random
subsets of the training data. Some of these decision trees tend
to grow deep, sometimes leading to overfitting. This effect can
be reduced by balancing the output of the decision trees and
through tree pruning. By using a random forest classifier on
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Fig. 5: Performance of CNN architectures on the test unknown partition, fine-tuned or trained from scratch in the train partition
of each dataset. Our proposed architecture has fewer layers, takes less time to train, and results in similar or superior accuracy
to other known CNN architectures.
top of the results of the different multi-view-CNN predictors,
we can consolidate their outputs into a single prediction
measure. As byproduct of this fusion, the random forest is also
able to provide a ranking of predictor’s importance, which can
help us to select the most relevant predictors for our task.
Random Forests can estimate the test error (generalization
error) of the ensemble, without needing to keep a separate
test data partition. This is called out-of-bag (OOB) error
estimation: the prediction error is calculated on all the samples
that are left out of the bootstrap for each of the decision
trees. During the process of training a Random Forest, after
each tree is constructed, OOB error rate (of all variables) is
compared to the classification error of the permutation of out-
of-bag examples for each of the variables. As a result, we get
an estimate of how much the misclassification error increases
if each of the variables is disturbed. This measure is called
variable importance.
2) Voting Fusion: Another strategy we exploit for decision-
making is fusion through voting. We considered majority and
weighted voting. In its simplest form, majority voting [50],
[53] considers all 61 CNNs as inputs to decide whether or
not a given sample should be considered as an authentic
or an attack. The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that if all
classifiers produce independent predictions, and if each has a
probability of correct prediction that is greater than 0.5, the
addition of more voters will increase the probability that the
consensus will make the correct decision [50]. Veering away
from simple majority voting, in some cases it is desirable
to give greater weights to classifiers that are more likely to
yield the right decision. With this in mind, we also use a
strategy called Best-Worst Weighted Vote (BWWV) [54]. The
best and the worst ranking predictors are identified and receive
maximum and minimum weight (1 and 0, respectively). All
remaining predictor weights are linearly cast between these
extremes.
We consider two ways to attribute weights to CNN pre-
dictors: classification accuracy and rank importance. For the
former, predictors are sorted by decreasing accuracy for the
weight assignment. For the latter, predictors are sorted by
their rank importance calculated through the Random Forest
classifier. We refer to these techniques as BWWVA and BWWVI,
respectively.
3) Classifier selection and Meta-fusion: One would nat-
urally expect that some predictors provide complementary
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Fig. 6: Proposed algorithm for selecting predictors: after gen-
erating CNN outputs, a Random Forest is trained on the binary
results of all predictors (feature vector v ∈ R61 dimensions),
to rank predictors by importance. The most complementary to
each of the k most important predictors are calculated through
Cohen’s kappa statistic. Finally, a predictor list is generated
by selecting those which appear in two or more columns in
the calculated matrix.
views on the problem while other predictors are highly cor-
related. In this section, we present our proposed algorithm
for selecting the most relevant subset of predictors to use as
the final ensemble for the PAD. We take advantage of Gini
importance [55], measured with tree-based models, and inter-
rater agreement, measured using Cohen’s kappa statistic [56].
Gini importance should give us the most promising predic-
tors in terms of classification accuracy, while the inter-rater
agreement measure should give us the most complementary
predictors. Fig. 6 illustrates the proposed approach.
Our algorithm performs a score analysis of all multi-view-
CNN predictors’ outputs using the Random Forest algorithm
to find the k most important predictors. This step focuses on
which models are important in the classification task in terms
of their Gini importance, also known as mean decrease in
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impurity (MDI) [55]. In the context of our meta-analysis, each
node of a tree represents a single feature, which is the output
of a given predictor.
Gini importance measures how much the predictors decrease
the weighted impurity in a tree. More precisely, the RF
algorithm is a collection of decision trees aiming at splitting
the data into two branches so that similar patterns end up in the
same branch. The RF algorithm computes, during the training
process, how much each predictor decreases the weighted
impurity in a tree, and this metric is used to measure the
quality of such splits. Our proposed algorithm takes advantage
of that by ranking the multi-view-CNN predictors according
to this measure and selecting the top-k predictors, which will
be our initial pool of good candidates for the fusion step.
After finding the k most important models, we compute,
through the Cohen’s kappa statistic, which gives an agreement
estimation between two predictors, their l most complementary
predictors, ending up with a k× l matrix C of predictors. We
compute a final list of predictors by selecting those that appear
in two or more columns of C. The final decision-making
is accomplished through SVM meta-fusion, which takes k
selected predictor outcomes as the input.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we describe the datasets, validation protocols
and experimental results.
A. Datasets
Our work was performed on datasets made available in the
Iris Liveness Detection Competition 2017 [7]. There is one set
from each of four universities involved — Clarkson University,
Warsaw University of Technology, IIITD-WVU and University
of Notre Dame.
The Clarkson dataset [7], [44], [45] contains images of
live irises, textured contact lenses, and iris printouts. The
Warsaw dataset [7] comprises images of live irises and iris
printouts. The Notre Dame dataset [57] contains images of
live irises without textured contact lenses and of irises wearing
textured contact lenses. Finally, the IIITD-WVU dataset [58]–
[61] contains images of live irises, textured contact lenses,
iris printouts, and printouts of textured contact lenses. Table I
summarizes the composition of the datasets. For some of our
experiments, we also formed a merged dataset by combining
the four sets, which we will refer to as the “Combined” dataset.
The original cross-validation partitioning was kept the same
in the “Combined” dataset.
Each dataset is composed of a train partition, made available
to the participants to facilitate training their algorithms, and
a test partition, not distributed before the competition was
ended, and used by the organizers to evaluate the submissions.
LivDet-Iris 2017 co-organizers marked their test samples to
form two groups of images. In the first group, referred to
as test known, both live images and images of artifacts had
the same “known” properties as train samples. The images
belonging to a second group, test unknown, have different,
or “unknown”, properties than pictures included in the train
subsets. Competition organizers applied different strategies
when producing the test unknown samples. Clarkson Univer-
sity included visible-light image printouts and new patterns of
textured contact lenses, Warsaw University of Technology used
different equipment to prepare and photograph iris printouts.
The images of patterned contact lenses offered by University
of Notre Dame are of different brands than those in the train
set. Finally, the whole test partition of the IIITD-WVU bench-
mark is considered as test unknown, since it was collected by
a different institution (WVU) than the train set (IIITD), by a
different sensor, and included outdoor acquisitions. Figure 7
shows sample images of each dataset.
To keep our evaluation protocol compliant with LivDet-Iris
2017, training of our methods uses solely pre-defined training
partitions of the datasets, while the final performance is
estimated both on the test known and test unknown partitions.
B. Experimental Protocol
Our experiments followed the LivDet-Iris 2017 competition
protocol [47], using the same datasets and train/test partitions
as described in Section IV-A. A sub-partition consisting of a
randomly selected 20% of the images from each train set was
created to serve as a validation set during training. The system
is trained to perform binary classification: authentic iris images
should be labeled as live, while attack images (textured contact
lenses, printouts of live images or printouts of textured contact
lenses) should be labeled as attack.
We measure the performance of classifiers using four met-
rics:
• Accuracy, which is the ratio between the number of
correctly classified images and the total number of images
classified,
• Bona-Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate
(BPCER), which is the proportion of live images that
were incorrectly classified as attacks,
• Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER),
which is the proportion of attack images incorrectly
classified as live samples, and
• Half Total Error Rate (HTER), which corresponds to the
average of BPCER and APCER.
BPCER and APCER error rates were defined by ISO/IEC
30107-3 [43] and adopted in LivDet-Iris 2017 for evaluation of
submissions. The accuracy and HTER are used in the training
stage for ranking the obtained solutions.
The CNN classifiers output a liveness score in the range of
〈0, 1〉 and the decision threshold was 0.5, as defined in the
LivDet-Iris 2017 protocol. The source-code to reproduce all
of our experiments is available to researchers 2.
C. Evaluation of BSIF Representations and CNN-based De-
tectors
The first part of our work was to train and evaluate 61
lightweight CNNs, which act as primary predictors in our
system. As it could be anticipated, individual CNN predictors
result in a very good accuracy on the train and test known
partitions, but they do not generalize well to test unknown
2Available on GitHub: https://github.com/akuehlka/mvlc ipad.
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TABLE I: Composition of the Datasets
Dataset Train Test known Test unknownLive Contacts Printouts Live Contacts Printouts Live Contacts Printouts
Clarkson 2,469 1,122 1,346 1,485 765 908 638 494 144
IIITD-WVU 2,250 1,000 3,000 – – – 702 701 2,806
Notre Dame 600 600 – 900 900 – 900 900 –
Warsaw 1,844 – 2,669 974 – 2,016 2,350 – 2,160
Combined 7,163 2,722 7,015 3,359 1,665 2,924 4,590 2,095 5,110
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Fig. 7: Image samples from all datasets, from the train and unknown partitions. The difference between train and unknown
images, especially in the case of attacks, illustrates situations where classifiers commonly fail.
data. This can be seen in Fig. 8, which shows the distribution
of accuracies obtained by all 61 CNN-based predictors.
Since the CNN is different for different feature descriptors,
one can assume the variation in performance is caused by the
ability of such descriptors to capture particular textures of the
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Fig. 8: Distribution of classification accuracies for individual
CNN predictors, on each dataset and partition.
images. This may suggest that some filters are particularly
good at classifying a certain type of attack (a certain textured
lens brand or a type of a printout), but they are inadequate for
others. The proposed method identifies good predictors and
aggregates them in order to create a more robust cross-dataset
PAD system.
Table II shows the top three CNN classifiers on each data
set. The size of the BSIF filters that performed best in each
data set may offer some insight about the types of features
that are being used for classification. While CNN predictors
achieved very high accuracy on Warsaw dataset using BSIF
filters of size ranging from 5 to 7, the best performing filters on
Notre Dame dataset are of size ranging from 3 to 5, while for
Clarkson data the best filters are larger, and their size ranges
from 7 to 15. The range of BSIF filter sizes that performed best
in IIITD+WVU goes from 5 through 17, which is consistent
with the wide diversity of images found in this dataset.
It is important to observe a basic difference in the datasets:
while Warsaw attack images are printouts, Notre Dame’s
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attack images are textured contact lenses. On the other hand,
Clarkson and IIITD+WVU attack subsets are composed of
a mix of textured contacts and printouts. Another fact that
should be noted is that these data sets do not have similar
proportions regarding the number of samples for each class in
each partition. As an example, while there are only 144 print-
outs (∼ 11%) in Clarkson unknown, IIITD+WVU has 2,806
(∼ 66%) printouts in the same partition. These differences in
data set composition may help to explain how different BSIF
filter sizes achieve different ranges of performance for each
dataset.
D. Fusion Evaluation
Before deciding that a more elaborate method for fusion
would be required, we experimented with basic methods.
Table III summarizes results of four basic fusion methods:
Random Forest (RF), Majority Voting (MV), Best-to-worst
Weighted Voting by Accuracy (BWWVA), and by Importance
(BWWVI). While there is no clear trend towards a specific
fusion method, all of them seem to perform best in specific
datasets and partitions. With regard to the data sets, the same
trend seen in the CNN predictors happens here: Warsaw had
the highest accuracy, followed by IIITD+WVU, Clarkson, and
Notre Dame. However, in some cases simple fusion led to an
obvious gain in accuracy that was not always the case: some
fusion methods were not able to obtain a better result than
the best individual classifier, typically in the unknown test
partitions.
RF fusion was the most successful method, outperforming
the others in three situations. With the exception of BWWVA,
which tied with RF in the unknown partition of Warsaw, all
other fusion methods were best in a single dataset/partition.
These somehow contradictory results motivated us to further
investigate this aspect. Fig. 9 shows the relationship between
the number of predictors and the output accuracy, for each
weighted voting fusion technique and for each data set. For
each fusion method and dataset, after the optimal number of
predictors is reached, the addition of extra predictors does
not improve the results, and in some cases it may even be
detrimental. In some cases, the optimal accuracy is reached
using a single predictor, but other cases may require up to 57
predictors.
TABLE II: Classification accuracy (%) of the top 3 predictors
for each dataset on the Test unknown partition.
Dataset BSIF Filter Accuracy HTER
Clarkson
15x15x11 87.08% 12.91%
07x07x10 82.69% 17.29%
13x13x12 80.74% 19.25%
IIITD+WVU
05x05x07 81.87% 47.45%
09x09x11 78.69% 27.03%
17x17x07 77.62% 19.41%
Notre Dame
05x05x11 71.78% 28.22%
05x05x10 69.11% 30.89%
03x03x06 67.83% 32.17%
Warsaw
05x05x11 98.00% 2.08%
07x07x12 93.84% 6.24%
05x05x08 91.95% 8.26%
A method for predictor selection is necessary so that we can
obtain the best accuracy from the ensemble. However, this
process is not trivial: the analysis of the predictor-accuracy
relation in other data partitions (train and validation) reveals
significantly different trends. Consequently, it is not always
possible to determine the optimal number of predictors to be
used in the unknown partition by simply using information
from other partitions.
Accuracy is the obvious metric of choice for selecting
the best base classifiers, but it does not tell us about the
complementarity relations between different classifiers. The
Gini importance measure calculated by training a Random
Forest can suggest the best classifiers, based on how much
each predictor helps to reduce the impurity in a decision tree.
Therefore, it can also be used as a criterion for predictor
selection. However, neither of these estimations helps us to
determine an optimal number of predictors. Furthermore, our
results show there is no distinct advantage in using either
accuracy or importance. These results motivated us to search
for a method for selection of predictors that is based on their
already known properties, but also based on how different base
classifiers integrate with each other.
E. Cross-Domain Evaluation
With the exception of Clarkson, all LivDet-Iris 2017
datasets were designed to allow cross-sensor evaluation. Im-
ages in their unknown partitions were captured with different
sensors and environments. Additionally, we conducted cross-
dataset experiments to verify the possibility of transfer learning
across these datasets. However, direct cross-dataset evaluation
using simple fusion did not result in good accuracy. In fact,
training CNN predictors in one data set and testing them in
another resulted in accuracy no better than random prediction.
One of the premises of our approach is the use of multiple
views of the data, in order to capture texture subtleties. We
can confirm this if we consider the ranges of BSIF filter sizes
that had better accuracy in the different data sets. This suggests
there is enough difference in texture scale from one data set to
another to cause the individual CNN predictors not to be able
to recognize them. The variation of these data sets in nature
(texture contacts, printouts, or a mix of both), composition
(regarding sizes of partitions and classes), acquisition devices
and environments can explain the limited ability for transfer
learning here.
Despite the fact that direct cross-dataset evaluation was not
successful, training CNN predictors in a combined dataset
produced much better results. Table IV shows a comparison of
all predictors and their fusion in the combined dataset. Both
individual CNNs and simple fusion methods achieved typically
over 95% classification accuracy in the known test partition. In
the unknown partition, while most CNN predictors achieved
HTER of 12% or lower, all simple fusion methods obtained
HTER below 8%, with classification accuracies higher than
91% even on the unknown set.
Fig. 10 shows the distribution of HTER for fusion methods,
in a comparison between training on each individual dataset,
and training on the combined dataset. Performing the train-
ing on the combined dataset was particularly favorable in
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TABLE III: Results for four simple fusion strategies on the test known (K) and test unknown (U) partitions; best HTERs in
bold.
RF MV BWWVA BWWVI
Accuracy APCER BPCER HTER Accuracy APCER BPCER HTER Accuracy APCER BPCER HTER Accuracy APCER BPCER HTER
Clarkson K 97.74 4.45 0.74 2.59 99.48 0.00 0.87 0.44 99.44 0.00 0.94 0.47 99.40 0.09 0.94 0.52U 78.70 41.94 0.63 21.28 85.59 28.17 0.63 14.40 86.37 26.60 0.63 13.61 85.75 27.70 0.78 14.24
IIITD+WVU K - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -U 83.34 15.94 20.23 18.08 83.82 12.83 32.91 22.87 84.25 12.29 33.05 22.67 83.06 9.21 55.56 32.38
Notre Dame K 99.44 0.44 0.67 0.56 99.33 0.22 1.11 0.67 99.39 0.33 0.89 0.61 99.27 0.44 1.00 0.72U 85.11 29.33 0.44 14.89 82.39 34.22 1.00 17.61 81.61 35.78 1.00 18.39 82.28 34.44 1.00 17.72
Warsaw K 99.80 0.05 0.51 0.28 99.87 0.04 0.31 0.18 99.87 0.05 0.31 0.18 99.90 0.00 0.30 0.15U 99.51 0.32 0.64 0.48 99.49 0.37 0.64 0.50 99.51 0.37 0.59 0.48 99.46 0.23 0.81 0.52
TABLE IV: HTER (%) on the Combined dataset.
No Fusion RF MV BWWVI BWWVA
(avg.)
K 2.57 0.74 0.65 0.59 0.63
U 12.47 7.02 6.89 7.12 6.88
IIITD+VWU dataset, in which HTER was reduced from more
than 25% to nearly 10%.
F. Evaluation of the Proposed Meta-Analysis: Selection and
Meta-Fusion of Classifiers
In this section, we evaluate the proposed method designed
to automatically select the most relevant multi-view-CNN
predictors, in terms of their importance and complementarity,
and to fuse their individual results via meta-fusion approach,
which was performed using the Support Vector Machine.
First, we used our proposed algorithm described in Sec-
tion III-C3 to select the most relevant predictors from a pool
of 61 predictors. Next, we performed a meta-fusion using the
SVM with a radial basis function kernel. Both the parameters
of the SVM and the parameter k (see Sec. III-C3) were found
through grid search in the aggregated training sets of all
datasets considered in this work. The known and unknown test
sets were used only to report the final performance results.
We performed a fine grid-search of parameter k on the
neighborhood of (5, 20), and the best HTER was achieved
with k = 16. According to one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, the observed differences in the HTER values obtained
for each k are statistically significant at the significance level
α = 0.05 (p-value = 0.0004). Henceforth, we use k = 16 to
report performance results of our proposed method.
Furthermore, Table V shows the effectiveness of our meta-
fusion approach compared to the best multi-view-CNN pre-
dictor and the majority vote fusion technique. In addition to
the results for test known and test unknown partitions, Table
V also presents overall test, which corresponds to the accu-
racy obtained on both test partitions combined. These results
are in agreement with those reported in the literature [50],
which states that both accuracy and complementarity are the
foundation for effective fusion.
G. Comparison with the State of the Art
In this section, we compare our results with the LivDet-
Iris 2017 best performing method. As we can see, our method
outperforms the competition winner. Table VI summarizes the
results of the competition in contrast to our best solution
developed solely on the LivDet-Iris 2017 train partitions.
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Fig. 9: Relationship between classification accuracy and number of predictors used in the fusion. The top row shows results
for BWWVA, and the bottom row for BWWVI.
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Fig. 10: HTER distribution for fusion methods. On the left, training and evaluation is performed on each individual dataset.
On the right, training is performed on the combined dataset, and evaluation is performed on each individual dataset.
Even in the cases where our methods were not able to
outperform one of the specific error rates, we were able to
significantly reduce the combined error rate. This happens, for
instance, in the overall performance on IIITD+WVU dataset:
the best HTER among LivDet-Iris 2017 competitors is 16.7%.
Although our methods did not outperform their BPCER of
3.99%, we managed to lower HTER to 7.9% on that specific
dataset. Similar situations occurred on all datasets, showing a
consistent improvement of our results over the state of the art.
TABLE VI: Comparison of HTER (%) with LivDet-Iris 2017,
on the combined test known and test unknown partitions.
Proposed
Dataset LivDet-Iris 2017 Meta-Fusion Error
Winner approach Reduction (%)
Clarkson 9.59 9.45 1.46
IIITD+WVU 16.70 14.92 10.66
Notre Dame 4.03 3.28 18.61
Warsaw 5.81 0.68 88.30
Average 9.03 7.08 21.59
Meta-Fusion results were further improved when applied
to the combined dataset. Table VII presents these results in
comparison with LivDet-Iris 2017, and also with our previous
Meta-Fusion results. The overall HTER was reduced from 7%
to 4% when Meta-Fusion was applied to the combined dataset.
At this point, it is necessary to be clear about the LivDet-Iris
2017 comparison: the known and unknown HTER numbers
presented in Table VII are estimated. Since BPCER is not
available for all known and unknown test partitions in LivDet-
Iris 2017, we assumed 0 (perfect score) in our estimation.
Even with this optimistic assumption about the competition
results, our method achieved an error reduction of more than
50% with regard to the former.
Our current implementation takes, on average, 0.028s to per-
form classification on a single image. Timing was performed
on a 4-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2650 v4 @ 2.20GHz
with 128GB of RAM, equipped with a GeForce GTX 1080 Ti
GPU. This time includes the CNN classification of the 61 data
views and the meta-fusion of their results. Since the LivDet-
Iris protocol does not establish parameters for speed efficiency
analysis, the main directive for our implementation herein was
classification accuracy. Therefore our method’s efficiency can
certainly be optimized, if needed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we addressed the iris Presentation Attack
Detection problem, as defined by the LivDet-Iris 2017 Com-
petition, using an approach based on an ensemble of multi-
view learning detectors. Our method has advanced the state
of the art in iris PAD and offered insight on the potential use
of different BSIF filters to deal with different textures in the
same domain.
TABLE V: Performance results (%) of the proposed method, majority vote, and the best individual CNN model for the test
known (K), test unknown (U), and overall test (O) partitions from datasets used in this work. The classifiers were trained on
the train partition of each dataset. † IIITD-WVU dataset contains only the unknown test partition.
Meta-Fusion via SVM BWWVA RF Best Individual CNN
Dataset Testing set APCER BPCER HTER APCER BPCER HTER APCER BPCER HTER APCER BPCER HTER
K 0.00 2.44 1.22 0.33 0.89 0.61 0.44 0.67 0.56 0.67 2.44 1.56
Notre Dame U 9.22 1.44 5.33 35.78 1.00 18.39 29.33 0.44 14.89 32.44 2.44 17.44
O 4.61 1.94 3.28 18.06 0.94 9.50 14.89 0.56 7.72 16.56 2.44 9.50
K 0.05 0.82 0.44 0.05 0.31 0.18 0.05 0.51 0.28 0.30 0.41 0.35
Warsaw U 0.09 1.49 0.79 0.37 0.60 0.48 0.32 0.64 0.48 20.97 0.68 10.83
O 0.07 1.29 0.68 0.21 0.45 0.33 0.19 0.58 0.38 10.63 0.55 5.59
K 4.55 0.20 2.37 0.00 0.94 0.47 3.48 0.47 1.98 1.26 1.75 1.50
Clarkson U 41.54 0.31 20.92 26.30 0.63 13.47 39.12 0.63 19.88 32.71 1.88 17.29
O 18.66 0.24 9.45 13.30 0.78 7.04 21.30 0.55 10.93 16.98 1.82 9.40
U
IIITD+WVU † O 12.32 17.52 14.92 12.29 33.05 22.67 5.56 21.23 13.39 21.81 72.22 47.02
Average O 8.92 5.25 7.08 10.96 8.80 9.88 10.48 5.73 8.11 16.50 19.26 17.88
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TABLE VII: Results in terms of HTER (%) for our Meta-
Fusion approach trained on the Combined dataset. Error re-
duction (ER) values present the error decrease achieved by our
approach with regard to LivDet-Iris 2017 winner.
Proposed Meta-Fusion approach (%)
LivDet-Iris 2017 Trained on Trained on
Dataset Winner each dataset Combined dataset
HTER HTER ER HTER ER
K 0.74a 1.34 -81.08 0.74 0.00
U 13.23a 10.49 20.71 8.39 36.58
O 9.03 7.08 21.59 4.44 50.83
aEstimated
We presented a new approach combining two techniques
for iris PAD: CNNs and Ensemble Learning. Extensive exper-
imentation was conducted using the most challenging datasets
publicly available. The experiments included cross-sensor and
cross-dataset evaluations. Results show a varying ability for
different BSIF+CNN representations to capture different as-
pects of the input images.
Simple fusion experiments show that although helpful, such
techniques are not yet capable to provide optimal classification
accuracy. In fact, we demonstrate how the continuous addition
of classifiers to the fusion does not necessarily improve the
classification performance. In that context, we presented a new
method for selection of classifiers, based on the meta-analysis
of their Gini importance and inter-classifier complementarity.
Our Meta-Fusion method was able to consistently outper-
form the LivDet-Iris 2017 competition winner, with an overall
Reduction Error Rate of more than 21%. Specifically, the
HTER in the Warsaw dataset was only 0.68%, corresponding
to a reduction in error of more than 88% in relation to the top
result reported in LivDet-Iris 2017. Although not as extreme as
in Warsaw case, classification accuracy was also improved for
other datasets, with reduction in error ranging from 1 to 19%.
Experiments with the combined dataset showed an additional
improvement of 37% on the overall HTER.
As a suggestion for future work, an immediate alternative
application for our method is face PAD. A significant portion
of face recognition attacks are based on printouts, as we
believe meta-fusion of multi-view-CNN predictors could be
easily applied to it with good potential for success.
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